| 摘要: |
| 风能是可再生能源系统的核心组成。近十年来，中国海上风电累计装机容量呈指数级增长。然而，“抢装潮”导致国家监管机构面临多重用海冲突与空间竞争难题，进而诱发利益纠纷。文章将多主体演化博弈框架引入海上风电治理领域，构建“政府—风电企业—农户”三元动态互 动模型，系统剖析海上风电开发中的利益协调机制，旨在降低社会冲突、实现利益协同。研究发现：（1）海上风电建设初期，由于缺乏有效协调机制，风电企业为追逐短期利润倾向压低补偿；政府因社会效用尚未显现而监管激励不足；农户受制于信息不对称、举证能力不足及各方社会责 任履行缺位等多重约束，处于相对弱势地位，三方易锁定于“非合作冲突”陷阱。（2）社会效用 水平、企业声誉损失及农户维权成本是影响冲突演化的关键因素：社会效用提升显著增强政府监 管意愿；当企业声誉负效用或诉讼风险超过临界值时，企业会由“低补偿”转向“高补偿”；农 户维权成本的高低直接决定其是否选择维权。（3）通过建立以惩罚为主、奖励为辅的监管框架， 明确分级处罚标准，并将生态约束纳入企业评估体系，可有效促使企业履行补偿责任，最终实现 帕累托最优与三方共赢。 |
| 关键词: 海上风电 演化博弈 冲突解决 三方共赢 |
| DOI：10.20016/j.cnki.hykfygl.2026.01.005 |
| 投稿时间：2025-10-19修订日期：2025-12-10 |
| 基金项目:国家社科基金重大项目（22 & ZD152）；国家社科基金一般项目（24BGL222）；浙江省哲学社会科学规划“高校基本科研业务费改革”专项课题（25NDJC099YBMS）；2023 年浙江省省属高校基本科研业务费项目（2023Y008）． |
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| A Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Spatial Conflicts in Offshore Wind Power Development |
| TIAN Peng,JIANG Xia,GU Bojun,FU Yufang |
| School of Economics and Management，Zhejiang Ocean University |
| Abstract: |
| Wind energy constitutes a core component of renewable energy systems．Over the past decade， China’s cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind power has grown exponentially．However，the rapid expansion driven by successive“rush-to-install”waves has placed national regulators under mounting pressure from competing sea-use demands and spatial conflicts，thereby triggering disputes among multiple stakeholders． This study introduces a multi-agent evolutionary game framework into the governance of offshore wind power development and constructs a tripartite dynamic interaction model involving the government，wind power enterprises，and coastal farmers．The model systematically examines the mechanisms of interest coordination in offshore wind development，with the aim of reducing social conflicts and achieving benefit synergies．The results indicate that：（1）In the early stages of offshore wind power development，in the absence of effective coordination mechanisms，wind power enterprises tend to suppress compensation levels in pursuit of short-term profits；governments exhibit insufficient regulatory incentives because social benefits have not yet fully emerged； and farmers remain in a disadvantaged position due to information asymmetry，limited capacity to provide evidence，and deficiencies in the fulfillment of social responsibilities by other actors．Under these conditions， the three parties are prone to becoming locked into a“non-cooperative conflict”equilibrium．（2）Social benefit levels，corporate reputational losses，and farmers’ rights-protection costs are the key drivers influencing the evolution of conflicts．An increase in social benefits significantly enhances governmental regulatory willingness； when corporate reputational disutility or litigation risk exceeds a critical threshold，enterprises shift from a“low compensation”to a“high-compensation”strategy；and the level of farmers’ rights-protection costs directly determines whether they choose to pursue legal or administrative remedies．（3）By establishing a regulatory framework that emphasizes penalties while supplemented by incentives，clarifying graded penalty standards，and incorporating ecological constraints into enterprise evaluation systems，enterprises can be effectively encouraged to fulfill compensation obligations，thereby achieving Pareto optimality and a win-win-win outcome for all three parties |
| Key words: Offshore wind power,Evolutionary game,Conflict resolution,Triple win |
