| 摘要: |
| 为从根本上解决我国渔业资源急剧衰退的问题，渔业捕捞限额制度的实施迫在眉睫；该制度的本质是对人和船进行管理，各主体不同策略的选择对其实施效果产生直接影响。文章从捕捞限额制度实施的监管层面出发，构建三方静态博弈模型，研究渔业生产者、渔业监管者和其他渔业生产者的博弈规律；提出应尽快构建监管体系并在实施初期放宽对政府疏于监管的惩罚，建立高额举报奖励机制，设立合理罚款额度等建议，以期为我国渔业捕捞限额制度的推进和现代渔业综合试验改革提供参考。 |
| 关键词: 渔业捕捞限额制度 静态博弈 渔业生产者 渔业资源 |
| DOI： |
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| 基金项目:农业部国家现代农业产业技术体系建设专项(CAR-50-G11) |
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| Game Analysis of the Main Body Behavior under the Fishing Quota System |
| LU Jiao,YANG Zhengyong |
| College of Economics and Management,ShangHai Ocean University;China Aquaculture Economic Research Center;Marine Industry Development Strategy Research Center |
| Abstract: |
| In order to fundamentally solve the deterioration of fishery resources，its urgent to implement the fishing quota system.The nature of this system is management of people and ships.The choices of different strategies for different subjects have direct effect on its implementation.The paper focused on the supervision level of fishing quota system and built three static game models to study the game rules of fishery producers，fishery regulators and other fishery producers.Suggestions on building regulation system as soon as possible，lightening the punishment for the lack of governments supervision in the beginning stage，establishing high public reporting rewards and setting up reasonable penalty system to provide the guide for the fishing quota system and modern fishery comprehensive test reform in China were also provided. |
| Key words: Fishing quota system,Static game,Fishery producers,Fishery resources |
