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  • 张林姣,沈满洪.东海陆源污染治理的演化博弈分析[J].海洋开发与管理,2017,34(4):3-12    
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东海陆源污染治理的演化博弈分析
张林姣,沈满洪
宁波大学商学院;宁波大学商学院;浙江省生态文明研究中心
摘要:
随着工业化和城镇化的推进,陆源污染物的排放量在逐渐增加,东海作为陆源污染的主要接受者,其环境也逐渐恶化。文章基于演化博弈分析方法,从陆源污染的治理主体出发,从企业与地方政府之间、沿海地方政府之间、沿海政府与海岛政府之间以及企业与公众之间建立演化博弈模型,根据复制动态图分析陆源污染治理的主体间的策略演进规律及其影响因素;根据相关因素提出相关策略,使演化博弈的稳定策略向(合作,合作)演化,以促进各主体协同治理陆源污染。
关键词:  东海  陆源污染  污染治理  演化博弈  海洋环境
DOI:
基金项目:浙江省哲学社会科学重大招标项目“生态文明制度建设研究”(14YSXK03ZD);国家社科基金重大招标项目“海洋生态损害补偿制度及公共治理机制研究——以中国东海为例”(16ZDA050).
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Control of Land-based Pollution Sources in the East China Sea
ZHANG Linjiao,SHEN Manhong
School of Bussiness,Ningbo University;Center for Ecological Civilization of Zhejiang Province
Abstract:
With the development of industrialization and urbanization,the emission of terrestrial pollutants is gradually increasing,and the environment of the East China Sea,which is the main recipient of terrestrial pollution,is also deteriorating.Based on the evolutionary game theory,the evolutionary game models were established from four aspects:between the central government and the local government,between the coastal local governments,between the coastal local government and the island local government,and between the government and the enterprise.Evolutionary rule and influencing factors were analyzed according to the replicated dynamical map.The relevant strategies were put forward according to the relevant factors,so that the evolutionary strategy of evolutionary game was evolved to promote the cooperation of various subjects to control the land-based pollution.
Key words:  East China Sea,Land based sources of pollution,Pollution control,Evolutionary game,Marine environment